How do neighbors influence investment in social capital? : Homeownership and length of residence by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How do neighbors influence investment
in social capital? : Homeownership and
length of residence
Eiji Yamamura
10. May 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22637/
MPRA Paper No. 22637, posted 11. May 2010 10:31 UTC
1 
 
How do neighbors influence investment in social 
capital? : Homeownership and length of residence.  
 
 
Eiji Yamamura 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses individual data from Japan to explore how the 
circumstances of where a person resides are related to the degree of their 
investment in social capital. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed 
effects and various individual characteristics, I found; (1) Not only that 
homeownership and length of residence are positively related to investment 
in social capital, but also that rates of homeownership and long-time 
residency in a locality increase an individual‟s investments in social capital. 
(2) The effects of local neighborhood homeownership and local length of 
residence are distinctly larger than those of an individual‟s homeownership 
or length of residence.  
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Introduction 
It is increasingly acknowledged that social capital plays a critical role in 
human behavior, thereby influencing economic outcomes (e.g., Putnam 1993, 
2000; Fukuyama 1995)1. Researchers in the field of regional studies have 
recently drawn attention to the issue of social capital (e.g., Glaeser and 
Redlick 2008; Kilkenny 2006; Westlund 2007). Based on standard economic 
theory, social capital formation can be analyzed using an investment model 
where the amount of social capital depends on an individual‟s decision 
regarding investment (Glaeser et al. 2002). By considering the spatial 
dimension, empirical works have attempted to investigate how social capital 
is accumulated based on individual decision making; suggesting homeowners 
are more likely to invest in social capital as a result of their lower mobility 
rates (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2010). On the other hand, 
evidence has been presented that household social ties with neighbors, which 
can be regarded as a kind of social capital, generate benefits for residents2. 
This benefit disappears if a household moves, reinforcing low residential 
mobility (Kan 2007). This indicates that individual decision making is 
influenced by the degree of accumulated social capital among neighbors. It 
follows from arguments such as those above that under circumstances where 
a larger amount of social capital is formed, a person is less likely to move and 
hence is more inclined to invest in social capital.  
 Not only an individual‟s features but also neighbor characteristics are 
expected to have a critical effect on individual behavior concerning 
individual investment in social capital3. Few researchers, with the exception 
                                                   
1 Some works have criticized the ambiguity of the definition of social capital and 
pointed out drawbacks in measurement (e.g., Paldam 2000; Durlauf 2002a, 2002b). 
2 Social network considered as social capital appears to make a contribution to 
technological diffusion among colleagues (Yamamura 2008a). 
3 It is found that people are less inclined to cooperate to resolve collective problems in 
more heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Yamamura 2008b). 
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of DiPasquale and Glaeser (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999), attempt to 
investigate the effects of homeownership and the length of residence on 
individual investment in social capital. Furthermore, although investment in 
social capital appears affected by socio-economic conditions, investigations 
have not been conducted outside of Western countries. How social capital is 
accumulated in countries outside the West needs to be investigated to 
determine the extent to which socio-economic conditions influence results. 
This paper uses individual level data from Japan to investigate not only the 
effects of individual homeownership and the length of residence, but also 
those of neighbors, and then compares the former with the latter.  
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In section 2, 
a simple theoretical model is presented. Section 3 describes data, the method 
of analysis and the estimation strategies. The results of the estimations and 
their interpretation are provided in section 4. The final section offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
Basic model 
In this paper, social capital is considered to be formed through 
aggregated individual investment for social activities such as involvement in 
a neighborhood association. Furthermore, this paper is based on the idea 
that rational behavior taken by an individual leads to investment in social 
capital (Glaeser et al., 2002)4.  
In the model, individual social capital is represented as the stock of a 
variable, S . Each individual gets a per-period utility flow of  ,HSR  where 
 HR  is a differentiable function with neighbor (or individual) immobility. 
 HSR  captures market returns. It is known that an interpersonal social 
network and trust are formed through long-term interactions among people, 
                                                   
4 Glaeser et al (2002) applies standard optimal investment to analyze the social capital 
formation. 
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resulting in a decrease in transaction cost (Hayami, 2001). It seems 
reasonably argued that the lack of population mobility leads to stable and 
long-term interpersonal relationships. Accordingly, I assume   0' HR .  
The social capital stock follows the dynamic budget constraint, 
ttt ISS  1  . 1  represents the depreciation rate. The level of investment 
in t period, tI , has a time cost  tIC , where  C  is increasing and convex. The 
opportunity cost of time is,w , which represents the wage rate if the labor 
supply is inelastic. Individuals discount the future with a discount factor  . 
Individual lifespan is denoted as T. An individual‟s maximization problem 
can be expressed as: 
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An individual maximizes their objective function, taking H as fixed. The 
first-order condition associated with this investment problem is given by: 
   .
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This first-order condition suggests a comparative statistic result. Social 
capital increases with neighbor (or individual) immobility, H. It follows from 
this result that neighbor (or individual) homeownership and length of 
residence are positively associated with an individuals‟ investment in social 
capital. However, it is unclear whether the effects of neighbor immobility on 
an individual‟s investment are larger than those of individual immobility. To 
examine this, empirical estimations are conducted in the following sections. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
This paper used individual level data containing information related to 
areas such as social capital index, years of living at the current address, 
homeownership, demographic (age and sex) and economic (occupation, 
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household income) status5. This data was constructed from the Social Policy 
and Social Consciousness (SPSC) survey conducted in all parts of Japan in 
2000. Five thousand adults (aged 20 years old or older) were invited to 
participate in a survey that utilized stratified two-stage random sampling. 
The survey eventually collected data on 3991 adults, a response rate of 
79.8 %6. Sample points were divided into 11 areas. In each area, according to 
their population size, cities and towns are divided into 4 groups such as the 
13 metropolitan cities, cities with 200 000 people or greater, cities with 100 
000 people or greater, and towns and villages. Therefore, 4 population groups 
exist within each of the 11 areas. Hence, area-population groups can be 
divided into 44, which are defined as local groups in this paper. As shown 
later, variables to capture neighbor characteristics are calculated in accord 
with these local groupings.7. 
Table 1 includes variable definitions and basic statistics. Following the 
discussion in Putnam (2000), the degree of civic engagement is considered as 
investment for social capital in this research. Thus, social capital was 
measured using the question “Are you actively involved in the activity of a 
neighborhood association?” Responses ran from 0 (not at all) to 3 (Yes, 
actively involved). This measure, however, reflects only a facet of the 
investments made in social capital because, besides the activity of a 
neighborhood association, various other community activities are thought to 
be connected with the accumulation of social capital. Other reports have 
used similar measures as a proxy for social capital investment. DiPasquale & 
                                                   
5 The data for this secondary analysis, "Social Policy and Social Consciousness survey 
(SPSC), Shogo Takekawa," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, 
Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, 
The University of Tokyo. 
6 Respondents did not respond to all questions and therefore 3075samples were used for 
regression estimations. 
7 According to the data used in this research, 4 areas do not contain metropolitan cities. 
Thus, only 40 local groups exist in the data. 
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Glaeser (1999) used the General Social Survey (the GSS) conducted in the 
U.S. They used various variables as proxies for social capital 8 . These 
variables were, however, not purposefully collected and so were not fully 
suited to the examination of investment for social capital. Hilber (2010) used 
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS), the first 
attempt at widespread systematic measurement of social capital in U.S. 
Hilber (2010) focused on four measures of individual social capital 
investment for their estimation: (1) participation in neighborhood 
associations, (2) the number of social interactions with immediate neighbors, 
(3) the number of social interactions with co-workers outside work, and (4) 
participation in service and fraternal organizations. In the case of Japan, 
further work using additional proxies for examination of social capital 
investment will be needed to confirm the robustness of this paper. 
Homeowner was measured using the question “What is your type of 
residence?” The responses were “I own my home,” “I reside in a home owned 
by a parent” and “other”. For the basic estimation, I defined homeownership 
as being a home owned by individuals or their parents.  
 
Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
I see from Table 2 (1) that a homeowner is significantly more likely to 
invest in social capital. Table 2 (2) shows that a person living at their current 
address longer than 20 years is more inclined to invest in social capital. 
These results are in line with the evidence provided by earlier report that 
barriers to mobility give individuals an incentive to investment in social 
capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2010).  
I now explore how the local circumstance of individuals, captured by 
                                                   
8 For instance; (1) membership of nonprofessional organizations, (2) knowing the names 
of local political luminaries (the head of the local school board and the local U.S. 
representative), (3) voting in local elections, (4) church attendance, (5) gardening, and 
(6) trying to solve local problems. 
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neighbor homeownership and length of residence, are related to an 
individuals‟ investment in social capital. Following the model used by 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), the estimated function takes the following 
form: 
SC im= 0 + 1 HOME im+ 2LIVE20im +3LIVE10im +4AVHOMEim 
+5AVLIVE20im+6AVLIVE10im+7CHILDim+8MARRIim+9DIVm+10AGEi
m+11INCOMEim+12UNIVim+13MALEim+em+ uim , 
where SC im represents the dependent variable in resident i, and area m. 
‟s represents regression parameters. em represents unobservable area 
specific effects that are controlled by dummy variables. uim represents the 
error term. In addition to the OLS model, the Ordered Probit model is also 
employed since the dependent variable is qualitative and ranges from 0 to 3. 
Individual homeownership dummy, HOME, is used to capture the 
homeowner effect. If a homeowner tends to invest in social capital, the 
anticipated sign of HOME is positive. As discussed by DiPasquale and 
Glaeser (1999), HOME is possibly correlated with unmeasured factors 
included in uim. HOME is thus thought to be an endogenous variable, 
resulting in estimation bias9. A person residing in a home owned by a parent 
is less likely to suffer endogenous bias since it is exogenously determined 
whether a parent is a homeowner or not. Therefore, I omit the samples 
where an individual is the homeowner and newly define the dummy variable, 
which takes 1 if one‟s parent is the homeowner, otherwise 0, as HOME, to 
conduct alternative estimations aiming to alleviate endogenous bias10. To 
                                                   
9 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) considered the average group homeownership rate as 
an exogenous variable and used it as an instrument variable. Similar results are 
obtained if the same estimation method is employed using the data used for this 
research, although estimation results are not reported. I regard such a group average 
variable as more useful for capturing the neighborhood effect as an independent 
variable. 
10 Sample size is 3075 when all samples are used. Among these, samples are 2349 when 
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capture the effect of length of residence, individual long resident dummies 
such as LIVE20 and LIVE 10 are used. According to Kan (2007), length of 
residence can be considered as the degree of integration into the 
neighborhood. People integrated into the neighborhood are thought to be 
inclined to invest in social capital since the return from the investment is 
expected to be large. Hence, coefficients of LIVE20 and LIVE10 are predicted 
to take the positive signs. What is more, longer time residents are more 
inclined to invest in social capital so that the magnitude of LIVE20 is 
anticipated to be larger than LIVE10.  
The rate of neighborhood homeownership can be regarded as the degree of 
local population immobility, since homeownership creates a barrier to 
mobility. As a consequence, homeowners have a tendency to invest in social 
capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). By definition, the rate of long-time 
residence is also thought to reflect local population immobility. Long-time 
residents are likely to have long-term relationships with neighbors since 
people will move if they fail to construct good relationships with their 
neighbors11. Hence, neighborhood homeownership and length of residence 
are thought to be proxies for accumulated social capital. Neighborhood 
homeownership and length of residence are measured by group average 
HOME rate (AVHOME) and group average LIVE20 and LIVE10 rates 
(AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10) within a local group, respectively. To exclude an 
individual i‟ s effect from i‟ s local group average, i‟ s sample is omitted from 
                                                                                                                                                     
HOME takes 1. So, the homeownership rate is 76% in all samples. More precisely, 2349 
homeownerships are made up of 1878 individual homeownerships and 471 of parent 
ownership. Therefore, the sample size used in the alternative estimations becomes 1197 
since the individual homeownership samples are omitted. In this case, the parent 
homeownership rate becomes 39%. 
11 People would suffer from ostracism if they infringe social norms considered as local 
rules, leading to people following norms (Hayami 2001). Such a „community mechanism‟ 
seems to be, to a certain extent, effective even in modern Japanese society (Yamamura 
2008c). 
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the samples when local average values are calculated. These variables would 
take positive signs if ample social capital within a community where a 
person resides encourages a person to invest in social capital. 
People with children are likely to have opportunities to interact with 
other parents through PTA meetings and various events for children held by 
community associations, leading the sign for CHILD to become positive. 
Several control variables are also included to capture individual 
characteristics: marital status, age, male‟s dummy, and university 
graduation dummy. 
 
Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Tables 3 and A1 presented in the Appendix report results using all samples. 
Alternative estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and A2, where I 
omit samples where a person is the homeowner and use the dummy variable, 
which takes 1 if a parent is the homeowner, otherwise it takes 0, as HOME. 
If homeownership creates a barrier to mobility, the length of residence is 
correlated with homeownership, resulting in multicollinearity. Therefore, in 
Tables 3, 4, A1, and A2, column (3) reports results when AVLIVE20 and 
AVLIVE10 are excluded, and column (4) results when AVHOME is excluded 
to compare the full model in column (2) with columns (3) and (4). 
I now discuss Table 3 that shows the results of OLS estimations. Looking 
at the first row shows that HOME has positive signs in all estimations, and 
is statistically significant at the 1 % level. This implies that a homeowner is 
more likely to invest in social capital, which is consistent with DiPasquale 
and Glaeser (1999). As anticipated, LIVE20 and LIVE10 yield positive signs 
in all estimations although LIVE10 is not statistically significant. As 
anticipated, the magnitude of LIVE20 is obviously larger than that of 
LIVE10. It follows from this that a barrier to mobility caused by individual 
characteristics enhances social capital investment. With respect to neighbor 
effects captured by AVHOME, AVLIVE20, and AVLIVE10, AVHOME 
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produces significant positive signs in columns (2) and (3). It is also 
interesting to observe that the values of AVHOME are about 4 times larger 
than those of HOME, which implies that neighbor homeownership makes a 
greater contribution to increases in social capital formation than does 
individual homeownership. AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 show positive signs, 
despite being statistically insignificant in column (2). If AVHOME is 
excluded, as exhibited in column (4), both continue to yield positive signs and 
AVLIVE20 becomes statistically significant at the 1 % level. Consistent with 
the prediction, AVLIVE20 is larger than ALIVE10. What is more, values of 
AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 are clearly larger than LIVE20 and LIVE10. 
Therefore, the neighbor length of residence effect is thought to be larger than 
the individual‟s length of residence effect. CHILD shows the anticipated 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level, suggesting 
parents are more likely to being integrated into the community, such as 
through involvement with the PTA. Most of the results concerning other 
variables, with the exception of UNIV which takes negative signs, are 
consistent with existing work (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). 
 I now turn to the results of Table 4 where samples are restricted. I 
concentrate attention on homeownership and length of residence. In all 
estimations, HOME and LIVE20 continue to exhibit significant positive 
signs although LIVE10 becomes negative. When I compare these with the 
full sample estimations seen in Table 3, the values of HOME are slightly over 
0.20 and are almost at the same level as HOME shown in Table 3. Those of 
LIVE20 are 0.12, larger than those of LIVE20 in Table 3. Overall, the results 
of individual homeownership and length of residence are robust when the 
endogenous bias of HOME is controlled for. As for AVHOME, it produces the 
expected positive signs and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Values 
of AVHOME are approximately 1, almost the same as those of AVHOME in 
Table 3. Both ALIVE20 and ALIVE10 take positive signs and ALIVE20 in 
column (4) is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Compared with the full 
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sample estimations in Table 3, values of AVLIVE 20 are almost the same as 
in Table 3, while values of AVLIVE10 show 0.60, larger than ALIVE10 in 
Table 3. Considering what has been observed overall in Tables 3 and, the 
effects of neighbor homeownership and length of residence are distinctly 
larger than those of an individual‟s homeownership effects, and continue to 
be held after alleviating the endogenous bias of individual homeownership. I 
can derive the argument from this that individuals are inclined to invest in 
social capital under circumstances where their community is a tightly 
knitted one based on long-term social ties with neighbors. In other words, a 
large amount of accumulated social capital enhances an individual‟s 
investment in social capital. The evidence from the U.S. provided by 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) did not find that the local homeownership 
rate significantly affects social capital investment, while their model predicts 
that local homeownership rates will affect investment in social capital. Thus 
the evidence from the U.S is contrary to that from Japan provided by this 
research. One reason why the neighbor effect is different between U.S. and 
Japan might be that U.S is racially more heterogeneous and so the 
neighborhood effect is decreased.  
As shown in the APPENDIX, the results of Ordered Probit estimations 
shown in Tables A1 and A2 correspond to those of the OLS estimations in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The results obtained by Ordered Probit 
estimations are similar to the OLS estimations, implying that the results of 
OLS are robust to alternative estimations and therefore strongly support the 
argument noted above. 
 
Discussion 
A benefit from social capital is that there is a reduction in transaction 
costs and the enhancement of collective action to deter people from free 
riding. Hence, market failure can be coped with by social capital considered 
as local public goods (Hayami 2001). Social capital thus appears to improve 
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economic efficiency and leads to economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer 
1997, Hall and Jones 1999). Long-term personal interactions within a 
community will deteriorate gradually under conditions where the market 
functions well because newcomers become community members. If the 
community is closed to newcomers, a newcomer is less likely to invest for 
social capital even if the social capital is large. As a consequence, social 
capital will be diminished over time. If this is true, the development of a 
market will impede the accumulation of social capital. Based on a similar 
logic, using a trading model to investigate the connection between the 
growth in labor mobility and social capital, Routledge and von Amsberg 
(2003) indicated that social capital increased at the expense of an efficient 
mobile labor force. Even if, as generally believed, a community is closed to 
strangers, it is induced to open up and adjust to modern socio-economic 
environments under pressure from nation-wide or global economic 
integration. In short, social capital within a community relies on its 
particular circumstances, especially during a transition period.  
Annen (2001, 2003) developed a concept of social capital governance that 
distinguishes between inclusive and exclusive social capital12. Exclusive 
social capital creates market segmentation while inclusive enhances 
interactions among different groups13. It was argued that inclusive social 
capital furthers economic performance while exclusive may not. Here, I 
suggest another scenario. If a community is open to newcomers and social 
capital is abundant, not only existing members but also newcomers are more 
likely to invest for social capital. As a result, greater social capital will be 
accumulated. Policy makers need to ensure communities are open to 
newcomers and in this way enhance the subsequent accumulation of social 
                                                   
12 Annen (2001) argued that the exclusive social capital induces the rent-seeking 
activity. 
13 Knack (2003) made it evident that the positive effect of the inclusive social capital is 
observed while the negative effect of exclusive social capital is not observed. 
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capital when the market functions well.  
 
Conclusions 
How and the extent to which the incentive to invest in social capital 
increases when individuals own their home has been well investigated. 
However, little is known about the effects of a neighbor‟s homeownership on 
individual investment in social capital. This paper aims to explore how the 
circumstances of where a person resides are related to the degree of their 
own investment in social capital using data of the 3 075 adult participants in 
the 2000 Social Policy and Social Consciousness (SPSC) survey. This paper is 
the first to apply the framework of Glaeser et al (2002) to examine whether a 
neighborhood‟s characteristics influence individual investment for social 
capital in Japan. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects and 
various individual characteristics, I found;  
(1) Not only that an individual‟s homeownership and length of residence are 
positively related to their investment in social capital, but also that the rates 
of homeownership and long-time residence in a locality increase an 
individual‟s investments in social capital.  
(2) The effect of local neighbor homeownership and length of residence are 
remarkably larger than that of an individual‟s homeownership.  
Empirical study provided evidence that the effect of a neighborhood‟s 
immobility on social capital formation is larger than those of an individual‟s 
when a person makes a decision regarding investment. What came out most 
clearly from this investigation was that not only an individual„s 
characteristics but also positive externality stemming from neighborhood 
immobility have crucial roles in social capital formation and thus should be 
considered in any study related to social capital. The main contribution of 
this paper is to provide evidence that accumulation of social capital in a 
locality leads to individuals investing more for social capital. 
The endogenous problem of homeownership appears to cause estimation 
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bias but was not sufficiently controlled in this study. Therefore, suitable 
instruments need to be determined and then two-stage estimation conducted. 
Further, this study was limited to Japan and the findings provided thus far 
cannot be easily generalized. The findings of this study are not fully 
congruent with the findings from the U.S. (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). To 
better verify the generality of the arguments presented here, study 
comparing results from other countries with different socio-cultural 
backgrounds needs to be conducted using larger sample sizes. These are 
issues remaining to be addressed in future studies. 
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TABLE 1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Note:  a 10 Million yen   
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean Max Min 
SC The degree of involvement in the activities of a 
neighborhood association runs from 0 (not at 
all) to 3 (actively involved).  
1.35 3 0 
HOME 
 
Takes 1 if one is a homeowner, otherwise takes 
0. 
 
0.76 1 0 
LIVE20 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current 
address for longer than 20 years, otherwise 
takes 0. 
0.62 1 0 
LIVE10 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current 
address for between 10 and 20 years, otherwise 
takes 0. 
0.17 1 0 
AVHOME Average value of HOME within an area. (Total 
HOME in the locality minus own 
HOME)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.76 0.98 0.43 
AVLIVE20 Average value of LIVE20 within an area. (Total 
LIVE20 in the locality minus own 
LIVE20)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.61 0.89 0.26 
AVLIVE10 Average value of LIVE10 within an area. (Total 
LIVE10 in the locality minus own 
LIVE10)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.17 0.26 0.04 
CHILD 
 
Takes 1 if a person has child, otherwise takes 0.  0.77 1 0 
MARRI Takes 1 if one has a spouse, otherwise takes 0. 
 
 0.75 1 0 
DIV Takes 1 if one experienced divorce, otherwise 
takes 0. 
 
0.03 1 0 
AGE Ages 
 
49 96 20 
INCOME Household income a 
 
0.65 0.23 0 
UNIV Takes 1 if one graduated from university, 
otherwise takes 0. 
 0.15 1 0 
MALE Takes 1 if one is male, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.47 1 0 
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TABLE 2  
Social capital and characteristics of residents. 
(1) Comparison of social capital between homeowner and non-homeowner. 
 Homeowner Non-homeowner t-value 
SC 1.46 1.01 12.6 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. 
 
(2) Comparison of social capital between people living at their current address for 
longer than 20 years and others. 
 Longer than 20 
years 
Others t-value 
SC 1.48 1.15 10.4 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of investment for social capital: All samples (OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.24** 
(5.91) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.22** 
(5.39) 
LIVE20 0.17** 
(3.80) 
0.17** 
(3.71) 
0.17** 
(3.77) 
0.16** 
(3.61) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.91** 
(4.44) 
1.01** 
(6.18) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.28 
(0.93) 
 1.03** 
(3.94) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.22 
(0.48) 
 0.33 
(0.70) 
CHILD 
 
0.31** 
(5.69) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.31** 
(5.66) 
MARRI 0.20** 
(3.69) 
0.19** 
(3.60) 
0.19** 
(3.59) 
0.20** 
(3.72) 
DIV -0.09 
(-0.95) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
-0.08 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(6.10) 
0.008** 
(6.25) 
0.008** 
(6.27) 
0.007** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
UNIV 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.78) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included 
when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * 
and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.26** 
(4.24) 
0.21** 
(3.31) 
0.20** 
(3.30) 
0.23** 
(3.81) 
LIVE20 0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.91) 
0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.85) 
LIVE10 -0.03 
(-0.46) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.43) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.89** 
(2.75) 
0.98** 
(3.68) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.81) 
 0.97** 
(2.57) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
CHILD 
 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
0.35** 
(4.21) 
0.35** 
(4.22) 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
MARRI 0.16* 
(1.95) 
0.15* 
(1.84) 
0.15* 
(1.81) 
0.16* 
(1.93) 
DIV -0.009 
(-0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(3.35) 
0.006** 
(3.29) 
0.007** 
(3.31) 
0.006** 
(3.28) 
INCOME 
 
-0.06 
(-0.91) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.93) 
UNIV 
 
-0.04 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.03 
(-0.42) 
MALE 
 
0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included 
when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * 
and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
Determinants of investment for social capital (Ordered Probit 
model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.30** 
(5.89) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.27** 
(5.37) 
LIVE20 0.21** 
(3.74) 
0.20** 
(3.66) 
0.21** 
(3.71) 
0.20** 
(3.55) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(4.41) 
1.24** 
(6.11) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.91) 
 1.26** 
(3.90) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.29 
(0.50) 
 0.41 
(0.73) 
CHILD 
 
0.39** 
(5.74) 
0.38** 
(5.64) 
0.38** 
(5.63) 
0.38** 
(5.71) 
MARRI 0.25** 
(3.76) 
0.24** 
(3.68) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.25** 
(3.80) 
DIV -0.10 
(-0.85) 
-0.09 
(-0.76) 
-0.09 
(-0.78) 
-0.09 
(-0.77) 
AGE 
 
0.009** 
(6.10) 
0.009** 
(6.26) 
0.009** 
(6.28) 
0.009** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.44) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
UNIV 
 
-0.09* 
(-1.66) 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
-0.07 
(-1.32) 
-0.08 
(-1.48) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- 
square 
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance 
at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A2  
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(Ordered Probit model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.32** 
(4.23) 
0.26** 
(3.30) 
0.26** 
(3.29) 
0.29** 
(3.79) 
LIVE20 0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.15* 
(1.85) 
0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.14* 
(1.78) 
LIVE10 -0.05 
(-0.57) 
-0.04 
(-0.47) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.05 
(-0.54) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(2.76) 
1.21** 
(3.63) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.40 
(0.73) 
 1.17** 
(2.47) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.72 
(0.80) 
 0.70 
(0.79) 
CHILD 
 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
0.44** 
(4.23) 
0.44** 
(4.24) 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
MARRI 0.20* 
(2.00) 
0.19* 
(1.89) 
0.19* 
(1.85) 
0.20* 
(1.99) 
DIV -0.004 
(-0.03) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
AGE 
 
0.008** 
(3.29) 
0.008** 
(3.25) 
0.008** 
(3.27) 
0.008** 
(3.22) 
INCOME 
 
-0.09 
(-1.00) 
-0.10 
(-1.08) 
-0.10 
(-1.09) 
-0.09 
(-1.02) 
UNIV 
 
-0.03 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
MALE 
 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- 
square 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance 
at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
